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For many years analysis of IMF conditionality overlooked the extent to 
which it was implemented. However, more recently increasing attention 
has been paid to implementation. Theoretical contributions have focused 
on the importance of special interest groups, but empirical evidence has 
failed to provide compelling support for the theory. Indeed, empirical 
studies have reported mixed results that sometimes seem to be 
conflicting. This paper identifies a range of economic, political and 
institutional factors that may, in principle, influence implementation. 
Using various measures of implementation, it then tests an econometric 
model designed to capture these influences over 1992-2004 exploiting 
improved sources of data. The results suggest that significant 
determinants of implementation are trade openness, the existence of veto 
players and the amount of resources committed by the Fund. The paper 
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Although much has been written about IMF conditionality, for a long time research 
into the effects of IMF programs failed to distinguish between those that were 
implemented and those that were not. Recently, more attention has been paid to 
implementation. In principle the IMF’s Executive Board only approves programs that 
it is confident will be implemented.  But what is the scientific basis for this judgment? 
What determines the implementation of IMF programs? This is the central question 
that this paper seeks to answer. 
Since the late 1990s advances have been made in our understanding of 
implementation on three fronts; theory, empirical estimation and policy. It is therefore 
an appropriate time to take stock of what we know and to offer new analysis based on 
the advances made. 
What can reasonably be expected from such an exercise? Expectations should 
not be set unrealistically high. Just as studies of the determinants of IMF lending have 
been able to identify a range of variables that seem to be important in influencing the 
pattern of IMF arrangements, but have been less successful in explaining them in 
detail, so it may be that an investigation into the determinants of implementation will 
provide a list of factors that influence it, but will be less efficient at estimating the 
probability of implementation in individual cases (Conway, 1994; Bird and Rowlands, 
2001, 2002). 
Our objective in this paper is to assemble a list of factors that theory suggests 
may be important and to see which of them are shown to be statistically significant 
based on large sample regression analysis. Although our ambitions are modest, the 
endeavor is far from easy. Many of the independent variables that we would like to  2
test are only imperfectly captured by the available data. Moreover, the dependent 
variable – the implementation of IMF programs – can be measured in at least three 
ways. The results we report should therefore be viewed as suggestive and indicative 
rather than definitive. 
The lay out of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the measurement of 
implementation. Section 3 summarizes the record on the implementation of IMF 
programs. Section 4 examines the existing evidence on implementation. Section 5 
provides a conceptual framework that builds on recent theoretical work and allows us 
to identify, in principle, a range of economic and political factors that may be 
expected to exert an impact on implementation. Section 6 undertakes new large 
sample regression analysis of implementation based on a political economy model. 
This section is divided into sub-sections that explain the econometric methodology 
adopted, the data used and the results found. It also interprets the results drawing on 
the theory of implementation. Finally Section 7 offers some concluding remarks and 
examines some of the policy implications of the empirical results.  
 
2. MEASURING IMPLEMENTATION 
 
There is no straightforward way of measuring the extent to which IMF conditionality 
is implemented; approximation is needed. Various proxies have been developed. 
 
(a) The Rate of Loan Disbursement 
 
  The most common proxy used is the extent to which a loan is disbursed 
(Killick, 1995; Mussa & Savastano, 2000; Joyce, 2003). The disbursement of IMF  3
loans is tied to the completion of program reviews, and thus to the fulfillment of 
conditionality. The IMF stops disbursing a credit if there is insufficient 
implementation. 
  The advantages of this proxy are that it provides continuous data and it is easy 
to measure. However, it also has disadvantages. Policy actions may be taken, but few 
or no resources drawn. Some countries choose not to draw down the full amount of an 
IMF loan. Programs may be precautionary. ‘Failure’ to complete a program as 
measured by the disbursement of Fund resources may reflect economic ‘success’ in as 
much as Fund financing is no longer needed. 
  However, and in contrast, a program may be completed in the sense that all the 
resources are used, while some of the conditions agreed at the initiation of the 
program may be left unimplemented. Waivers may be granted or conditionality may 
be modified.  
 
(b) Interruption Index 
 
  An alternative approach to implementation is to see whether the program is 
interrupted. Mecagni (1999) defines interruption as either an interval of more than six 
months between IMF arrangements, or a delay of more than six months in completing 
a program review. Schadler et al. (1995) examine the quarterly reviews of IMF 
programs, and define non-compliance as situations where performance criteria are not 
met and loans are suspended. 
  Ivanova, Mayer, Mourmouras and Anayiotas (2003) offer two binary variables 
measuring reversible and irreversible program interruption. Reversible interruption is 
where the review of a program is delayed, but the program is revived subsequently.  4
Irreversible interruption is where the arrangement is eventually terminated. Although 
termination may be followed by a replacement program such that a relationship with 
the Fund is restored, even in these circumstances interruption does provide a signal of 
the poor implementation of conditionality.  
 
(c) Implementation Index 
 
  A third measure of implementation uses the Fund’s Monitoring of Fund 
Arrangement (MONA) database, which contains detailed information about program 
countries, and has been compiled since 1992 by the IMF’s Policy Development and 
Review Department. Although this measure uses actual conditions, it relies on the 
subjective judgment of the Fund and weights individual conditions equally. 
  Furthermore, the MONA database only covers programs coming up for review 
by the Fund’s Executive Board, and thereby excludes cancelled or interrupted 
programs. Excluded programs are likely to exhibit poor implementation, and, 
therefore, the MONA index overstates implementation. For these reasons the MONA 
based measure of implementation is our least preferred one. For completeness, we ran 
the regressions described later in the paper using it, but anticipated that it would 
generate poor results. It did, and we therefore do not report them (although they are 
available from the authors upon request). 
            The three measures of implementation described above are correlated with one 
another. But as shown in Table 1, the correlation coefficients suggest that the 
measures are picking up different dimensions of implementation. They also show that 
there is a closer correlation between disbursement and interruption than between the 
MONA implementation index and either of the other two measures.  5
 
[Insert  Table 1] 
 
  In the empirical investigation that follows we focus on irreversible interruption 
since, in the light of the above discussion, this appears to be the best single measure of 
severe implementation problems. But we also check the robustness of our results by 
examining disbursement as well. Later in the paper we explore informally why results 
may differ as between the different measures of implementation. 
 
3. THE RECORD ON IMPLEMENTATION  
 
The record on the implementation of IMF programs has been explored in a number of 
studies. These are summarized in Table 2. Overall they span a period running from 
1969 to 2002. Early studies focused on the implementation of fiscal conditionality or, 
in some cases, other components of conditionality. Killick (1995) was the first to 
examine the disbursement rate, using an 80 percent cut off point (20 percent or more 
undrawn) for judging whether a program had been fully implemented. He examined a 
large number of programs relative to earlier studies and discovered that only 47 
percent of them were fully implemented. He also argued that case study research 
implied that his measure of compliance was a good proxy for judging the ‘success’ of 
programs. More recent studies have continued to use the disbursement rate but have 
also examined program interruption as well as the implementation index based on the 
MONA database. As anticipated in the previous section, interruption appears to be the 
most demanding test for implementation, with Ivanova et al. (2003) and Nsouli et al. 
(2003) reporting that only about 60 percent of programs passed this test.  6
Implementation measured by the disbursement rate and by the MONA-based index 
occurred in over 70 percent of programs; although, as Ivanova et al. show, the 
implementation of macro conditions in the MONA-based index is superior to that of 
structural conditions. 
  Our own calculations, based on 218 programs over 1992 – 2004, confirm the 
results found by both Ivanova et al. (2003) and Nsouli et al. (2003). Not only do our 
results show that irreversible interruption is the most difficult test to pass, but they 
also suggest that implementation has not improved since 2002, even though the 
Fund’s policy of ‘streamlining’ conditionality was in part intended to improve the rate 
of implementation (IMF, 2001). However, the results reported in Table 2 do perhaps 
suggest that, over a more protracted time period, there has been some improvement in 
implementation as judged by the disbursement rate. While Killick (1995) finds that 
‘full’ implementation occurred in only 47 percent of programs during 1979 – 93, we 
find that during 1992 – 2004 it occurred in 74 percent of programs. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
4. EXISTING EVIDENCE ON IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The existing literature on the implementation of IMF programs is summarized briefly 
in Table 3. As shown here, the various measures of implementation, as well as various 
methodologies and time periods have been used. Areas of consensus have emerged, 
but there are also disagreements. Most studies concur that political factors are 
important in influencing implementation, although there is disagreement about the 
precise nature of the political influence.  7
  Building on earlier research into the implementation of World Bank programs 
by Dollar & Svenson (2000), Ivanova et al. (2003) combine three measures of 
implementation using the ‘Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes’ (MIMIC) model. 
They set out to discover whether implementation is affected by political conditions, 
initial economic conditions, and IMF conditionality and effort. They find that the 
political factors listed in relation to their study in Table 3 are significant but that other 
factors are not. In related research, Nsouli et al. (2004) find further evidence of the 
importance of political factors, and discover that there is better implementation where 
ethnic tensions are low, governments are stable and less corrupt and where the 
military are less involved in politics. They find that more time spent in previous IMF 
programs, and more financing (relative to a country’s IMF quota) aid implementation. 
They also find that superior implementation contributes to superior macroeconomic 
performance in terms of inflation and ultimately balance of payments and fiscal 
outcomes. 
 
[Insert  Table 3] 
 
Studies by Dreher (2003) and Joyce (2003) emphasize the importance of the 
timing of elections and the openness of economies respectively. However, their 
studies fail to confirm some of the key results of earlier research, for example, finding 
no support for the claim that special interest groups play a central role. Further 
differences in the existing literature relate to the importance of initial conditions in 
general, as well as specific initial conditions in particular, and to the importance of 
democracy. For example, Edwards (1989) and Polak (1991) attribute poor 
implementation to adverse initial conditions and negative shocks. Dreher (2003) also  8
finds some initial conditions to be relevant and Mecagni (1999) supports the idea that 
negative shocks impede implementation. Ivanova et al. (2003) discover some 
supportive evidence for the importance of adverse initial conditions, but this fails to 
pass tests of statistical significance. Whereas Ivanova et al. (2003) find that the degree 
of democracy is statistically insignificant, Joyce (2003) suggests that it is, and Dreher 
(2003) finds that democracy helps implementation at election times. Political cohesion 
is found to be significant by Ivanova et al. (2003) but not by Joyce (2003), although 
he does find that regimes that have been in power for longer are less likely to 
complete programs. 
The existing literature leaves enough ambiguities that further empirical 
research is justified. New research can contribute by studying more recent evidence 
and better data, by drawing on ideas that have evolved from the literature, and by 
extending the methodologies adopted. The underlying purpose, however, remains to 
achieve a sound understanding of the implementation of IMF programs. 
 
5. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
With the kind of exercise to be undertaken in this paper the temptation is to embark 
on a data-mining approach with little theoretical motivation. The problem is that such 
an exercise frequently reveals results that vary significantly along with the 
specification of the equations estimated and the details of the sample. It is then 
difficult to draw firm conclusions. Unfortunately, formal theoretical modeling of 
implementation does not lend itself to specifying one particular and unique model that 
can be conveniently tested. Either models tend to be excessively narrow, or the data 
needed to test them are unavailable. Here we attempt to estimate a model that is  9
informed by political economy considerations, and includes variables that are likely, 
in principle, to exert an impact. In some cases a priori reasoning may lead to a clear 
expectation of the sign of the relationships. In others, there may be opposing forces at 
work such that it is unsafe to form a particular a priori view.  
A first component of our model relates to initial economic conditions at the 
outset of programs, with these covering performance variables such as inflation, 
economic growth, the current account, and international reserve levels (which reflect 
the degree of currency misalignment), as well as policy variables such as fiscal 
deficits and monetary expansion. The most straightforward assumption is that the 
worse are the initial conditions, the less will be the degree of implementation. 
However, this need not necessarily be the case. It may be, for example, that the design 
of programs is modified to take initial conditions into account. Targets may be less 
ambitious where initial conditions are weak. Or it may be that where economic 
performance and policy have deteriorated to a low level, a government’s commitment 
to reform becomes stronger. As a consequence, there may be less disharmony 
between the government and the IMF, and implementation may be better. 
A second component of our model captures a country’s vulnerability to 
exogenous shocks. For low income countries, shocks may emanate from the current 
account and result from their heavy reliance on export revenue from producing 
primary products whose prices are unstable, while for emerging economies they may 
also come from the capital account. It is tempting to assume that shocks will have a 
negative impact on implementation and will blow programs off course. At the very 
least they may create additional problems for economic management. Again, 
however, the relationship may be more nuanced than this. Shocks may be positive. 
Will such shocks necessarily improve implementation? They may instead allow  10
governments to disengage from the Fund with the result that programs lapse, as the 
country no longer needs to draw on IMF resources. Meanwhile, negative shocks may 
lead the Fund to grant waivers, with the result that programs remain uninterrupted and 
continue to be fully financed.  
A third factor influencing implementation is adjustment capacity. In principle, 
it may be expected that implementation will be superior in economies that are more 
diversified and flexible, and possess greater scope for economic adjustment. This may 
be proxied by the level of economic development, which is itself proxied by per capita 
income. It may also be captured by the degree of trade openness. Yet again, however, 
openness may work both ways. From one point of view, economies that are more 
open may be expected to have higher foreign trade price elasticities, making 
conventional exchange rate policies more effective. Demand management policies 
may also have an effect on the current account at a lower cost in terms of domestic 
economic activity. However, greater openness may also make an economy more 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Moreover, economies that are less open may have 
greater scope to benefit from trade liberalization. 
The fourth and fifth factors that may be expected to influence implementation 
are the level of financing from the Fund, and the ease with which future programs may 
be negotiated. Higher levels of financing should provide greater incentives for 
governments to complete programs since there is a greater financial reward for 
accepting the perceived costs of IMF conditionality. More resources will be available 
to compensate the losers from economic reform. However, things may again be more 
complex than this simple idea implies. Other things being given, higher levels of 
financing may encourage governments to substitute out of adjustment. The question is  11
then the extent to which institutional arrangements surrounding conditionality allow 
them to do this.  
Up to now we have covered only economic variables. What are the political 
factors that may, in principle, be expected to exert an impact on implementation and 
in what way? Once more, for many of them the a priori reasoning is ambiguous and 
unclear. The theory of policy implementation points to the importance of special 
interest groups (SIGs) or ‘veto players’ that have sufficient power to block reform 
(Drazen 2001; Mayer & Mourmouras, 2002, 2004)
1. However, available data only 
allow imperfect measures to be used in empirical studies. For example, the role of 
SIGs may not be captured appropriately by simply looking at their number, although 
in general terms it may become more difficult to push through reform where there are 
many of them. Opposition may, however, be more effective where there is just one 
well organized and influential SIG as compared to a large number of disorganized 
ones. In principle, the strength of SIG opposition need not necessarily be reflected by 
parliamentary opposition if there are non-proportional voting systems or non-
participation by SIGs in the parliamentary process. The opposition may, in any case, 
be within the government rather than outside it, as different ministries may have 
different views about the design of IMF programs. SIGs may furthermore influence 
the composition and nature of compliance rather than the level of compliance.  
In a democratic society, opposition groups will have greater voice and 
influence and this may make implementation more difficult for an incumbent 
government as it seeks to enact unpopular policy. At the same time, if democracy 
implies greater involvement by civil society in policy decision-making and majority 
support for policy reform, a higher level of ownership may, in principle, make it more 
likely that programs will be implemented. Powerful leadership, whether under a  12
democratic or totalitarian regime, may be more relevant than the political system 
itself, but again this is difficult to capture empirically. 
Regime durability may foster a consistent and coherent approach to economic 
policy, but it may also make economic reform less likely as special interests become 
more entrenched and able to resist reform that threatens any rents they receive under 
the status quo. Similarly corruption may also be anticipated to reduce the chances of 
implementation as distortions and rent-seeking occur. Although not beyond debate, 
there is also a broad consensus that corruption has a negative effect on economic 
growth which in turn makes it more difficult to implement reform. 
The stage of the electoral cycle may also be expected to exert an effect on 
implementation, although this is another case where there may be opposing forces at 
work. Theories of the political cycle suggest that governments seek to pursue 
expansionary policies shortly before elections in order to raise consumption, reduce 
unemployment and garner popular support. These policies are likely to be inconsistent 
with IMF programs. After elections, governments may have to pursue counter-
inflationary policies, which can either be blamed on the previous administration 
where there has been a change in the political party in power, or on the IMF where an 
IMF program is in place. This would be consistent with a political cycle of 
implementation based on the timing of elections, with implementation falling when 
elections are close. However, while incumbent governments may be anxious to 
demonstrate national sovereignty over policy in the build up to an election, they may 
not want to send out the negative signals about their economic management that may 
be associated with the failure to implement IMF programs. Similarly, the IMF may be 
reluctant to withdraw support shortly before an election for fear of being accused of 
trying to exert political influence. Much therefore depends on the circumstances in  13
which programs lapse. Is it the government that opts to disengage or the IMF that 
cancels or interrupts the program because of a country’s failure to implement 
conditionality? Of course, if the Fund is seen as an agent of powerful capitalist 
countries – as it has been by some of its critics – it could be argued that the Fund’s 
position will vary depending on the complexion of the incumbent government. 
Following an election, a new government may want to negotiate its own program with 
the Fund, one to which it is committed. If so, this would imply that implementation 
would not improve immediately after an election, but might improve after a lag of a 
few months. 
The above brief conceptual survey illustrates why a neat, cut and dried theory 
of implementation is difficult to construct. It also suggests that while both political 
and economic variables may play a role, the precise nature of this role is theoretically 
unclear. One is therefore drawn towards empirical investigation. What factors in 
practice appear to significantly influence the implementation of IMF programs, and to 
what extent is it a political rather than an economic phenomenon? 
 
6.  NEW EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
(a) Methodology and Data 
 
  We undertake regression analysis based on a pooled dataset in which each 
program is treated as an independent observation. Since the number of programs 
varies across countries the panel is unbalanced. Not all data are available for all 
countries or years and the number of observations for estimation depends on the 
choice of explanatory variables. The annual data cover the years 1992-2004 and  14
extend to 95 countries that participated in a Fund-supported program. All the 
variables, their definitions and the data sources are listed in Appendix I. 
  The macroeconomic data come from the International Financial Statistics, 
World Economic Outlook and World Development Indicators databases of the IMF 
and the World Bank. For the political economy data, the Polity IV Dataset (Marshall 
and Jaggers, 2002), the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) of the 
World Bank and the International Country Risk Guide datasets are used. The inherent 
subjectivity of some political datasets poses a limitation for the present study. 
  IMF programs include stand-by and extended programs, as well as programs 
under the concessionary facilities (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility and 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility) for low-income countries. Precautionary 
programs are excluded from the sample when the disbursement rate is used, since 
their inclusion would bias downwards the measurement of implementation. As 
mentioned earlier, in the results reported below we focus on the interruption measure 
of implementation but we use the disbursement measure to check for robustness. We 
do not use the MONA based measure
2. 
Many studies of IMF programs encounter potential problems of selection bias, 
since IMF program countries are not randomly selected. Furthermore, endogeneity, 
where factors affecting the impact of IMF programs are generated by the programs 
themselves, and reverse causality, where the causal connections run in the opposite 
direction to the ones implied can make interpretation difficult. Even though we cannot 
claim full immunity from these methodological problems we believe that they are less 
important in the case of the research reported here. All the countries in our sample 
have chosen to sign agreements. They thus share this underlying characteristic. With 
regard to endogeneity, it may be that the factors that foster implementation can be  15
encouraged over time via IMF conditionality. To an extent, and in principle, they may 
therefore be endogenous to the implementation of past IMF programs. But 
endogeneity seems extremely unlikely for contemporary programs in terms of the 
variables we include in our study. The implementation of contemporary programs will 
not affect initial economic conditions, or primary product producing status. Nor will 
many of the political variables we include be affected by contemporary 
implementation. Given the specification of our model, it therefore seems reasonable to 
assume that endogeneity and reverse causality will not be a problem. Nevertheless, 
implementation of contemporary programs may depend on the incidence of past 
programs, not just because these have encouraged openness and other forms of 
economic liberalization but also because a better relationship may have been 
established between governments and the IMF, leading to a greater commitment to 
economic reform, or simply because there is a need to keep the IMF on side. By 
including a measure of past involvement with the IMF, we therefore allow, to some 
degree, for the possibility of endogeneity and reverse causality, although this variable 
may also capture the probability as perceived by governments, that they will be 
penalized for poor implementation by being excluded from future access to IMF 
resources. 
 
(b) Model Specification 
 
  The choice of probit and tobit techniques in our preferred model and 
robustness checks is guided by the need to make efficient use of the information 
contained in the implementation measures and by the data available. The interruption  16
proxy used in the econometric analysis is a discrete binary random variable, whereas 
the disbursement proxy takes values between 1 and 100. 
  Our strategy is to relate the various indicators of the probability of 
implementation to the underlying political and institutional factors in the borrowing 
country, to institutional factors and to initial economic conditions. Although the 
probability of program implementation is unobservable, it is related to an observable 
implementation proxy. The model can be described as follows: 
, ' * i i i x y ε β + =  
where * i y  is the unobservable probability of successful program implementation, 
vector β  contains estimated coefficients, matrix  i x  contains economic and political 
economy variables, and  i ε  is a stochastic disturbance term. We assume a normal 
distribution and, hence, estimate the above equation as a probit model when we use 
the interruption index as the dependent variable and as a tobit model when we use the 
disbursement index in our check for the robustness of our results
3. 
  To examine the influence of political and economic conditions on 
implementation, each of our chosen proxies is regressed on an explanatory variable 
set containing economic and political variables. To obtain our preferred specification 
of the model we use a “testing down” approach. The unrestricted model includes 
variables that have been identified in the literature as significant determinants of 
implementation. We then sequentially drop regressors that do not have significant 
coefficients at the 10 percent level. Likelihood ratio tests are employed to test the joint 
significance of dropped variables. 
  The following were included as potential explanatory economic variables: net 
foreign direct investment as a percent of GDP, the rate of monetary expansion, trade 
as a percent of GDP, a dummy for primary product exporting countries, real GDP  17
growth, GDP per capita, the central government balance relative to GDP, the rate of 
inflation, the current account balance relative to GDP, and international reserves in 
months of imports. 
  Although there is an array of political variables that could be included in the 
regression analysis, including most of them at the same time would lead to 
collinearity problems and a loss of precision. On the other hand, omitting relevant 
institutional and political variables would lead to biased estimates. The political 
economy variables we include are: two election year dummies, one for pre-election 
years, and one for post-election years
4, the degree of democracy, the quality of the 
bureaucracy, corruption, ethnic tensions, the representation  of special religious, 
nationalistic, regional and rural interests in parliament, regime durability, and the 
existence of veto players as captured by new DPI data.  
The last two variables are worth a closer examination. The theory of 
implementation suggests that veto players or special interest groups are key 
determinants of program implementation. Various indexes have been employed in the 
literature to capture the influence of those whose agreement is necessary before 
policies can be changed. For instance, a political cohesion variable has been used in 
two studies; Joyce (2003) for the period 1975-99 and Ivanova et al. (2003) for the 
period 1992-98. Ivanova et al.  (2003) find it to be significant, while Joyce (2003) 
finds it to be insignificant.  The political cohesion variable takes the value of zero for 
a one-party government, of one for a coalition government with two parties, of two 
for a coalition government with three or more parties, and of three for a minority 
government. Based on Roubini and Sachs (1989), this variable does not distinguish 
countries according to the effectiveness of electoral checks on government decision 
makers. Nor does the variable take into account the degree of parties’ control over  18
members. Weaknesses with the political cohesion variable led the World Bank to 
delete it in versions of its DPI database after 2000.  
The veto players (checks) variable in the newer versions of the same database 
attempts to correct for some of the weaknesses of the political cohesion variable. It 
counts the number of veto players in a political system, adjusting for whether these 
veto players are independent of each other, as determined by the level of electoral 
competitiveness in a system, their respective party affiliations, and the electoral rules.  
The veto players (checks) variable has been modified and improved over the 
years (DPI2000, DPI2004). Earlier versions of it counted parties as veto players as 
long as they were in the government coalition (in parliamentary systems), even when 
the party was not needed to give the government the majority of the votes (e.g., 
Albania in the early 1990s, Finland in 1978, 1979). The current veto players (checks) 
variable only allows parties to count as veto players when their votes are needed for 
the government to sustain a majority. It therefore captures more efficiently the 
essential notion of veto players.  
Ivanova et al.  (2003) used a variable measuring the strength of special interest 
groups in parliament by computing the maximum share of seats held by parties 
representing special interests (religious, nationalistic, regional, and rural). Joyce 
(2003) used a similar variable; a dummy indicating whether the government party 
represented a special interest group. Ivanova et al.  (2003) found their SIG variable to 
be significant, but Joyce (2003) did not. We have updated the composite indicator of 
the strength of special interests used by Ivanova et al., and used it in our own 
regressions. While it was found to be significant in some of our earlier regressions, 
the existence of veto players seems to exert a more significant influence over 
implementation. This may not be surprising since the number of seats that SIGs have  19
in the parliament does not necessarily translate into effective veto power. On the other 
hand, the new veto players (checks) variable that we use directly measures effective 
veto power. 
  Several IMF-related variables were also included in our regressions to test 
whether the nature of IMF involvement influences the implementation of programs. 
The size of IMF credits relative to a country’s quota and the incidence of past 




  Table 4 lists the country programs that were included in our study. Table 5 
summarizes our probit estimation results, but only shows those coefficients that were 
found to be significant. Simple parameters as well as marginal effects are reported. 
 
[Insert  Tables 4 and 5] 
 
  From amongst the economic variables included in the regressions, only the 
volume of trade is found to exert a significant effect. Open economies have a better 
chance of having uninterrupted access to IMF resources. This result was confirmed 
when we examined disbursement as a check for robustness. The insignificance of past 
IMF programs implies that our finding is not picking up reverse causality.  
The size of programs, as measured by the amount of IMF financing in relation 
to a country’s quota, emerges as exerting a significant effect on program interruption. 
Larger resources appear to assist implementation. However, this finding was not  20
confirmed by the disbursement measure of implementation where the size of IMF 
loans appeared insignificant.   
Turning to the political dimension of implementation, the veto players variable 
is significant in explaining interruption. Our robustness check using the disbursement 
measure confirms this result. Powerful veto players do militate against the 
implementation of IMF programs.  However, none of the other political variables 
emerge as being significant
5.  
Table 5 also reports the predictive accuracy of our preferred model. Overall 
the model predicts accurately 65 per cent of the time. However, it is much better at 
explaining cases where programs are not interrupted than those where they are. 
Historical descriptive data suggests that about 60 per cent of programs proceed 
without interruption. A straight guess of non-interruption would therefore be accurate 
about 60 per cent of the time. Our model exhibits 82 per cent accuracy. We generate 
considerable additional explanatory power. For interruptions, however, our preferred 
parsimonious model performs much less well and no better than a straight guess based 
on past experience. In many cases where openness, veto players and the amount of 
IMF resources suggest that a program would be implemented without interruption, 
some other factor gets in the way. However, these other factors are not sufficiently 
systematic to show up in our large sample regressions; they appear to be largely 
idiosyncratic. 
 We can use the probit estimation to identify outliers. There are no clear 
outliers (using our definition of them) in the case of inaccurately predicted 
implementation. But there are with respect to interruption. To identify them we 
compare the predicted values for the probability of interruption with our binary 
indicator of interruption and compute a residual which is the actual value minus the  21
fitted probability
6. If we define ‘outliers’ as cases where the residual is +/- 1.5, we 
find that the cases of severely unpredicted interruption were Indonesia in 1997, 
Guyana in 1998, Jordan in 1996, the Philippines in 1998, Kyrgyzstan in 1998 and the 
Congo in 1996. As would be expected, removing these outliers improves the 
predictive performance of our model, but certainly does not allow us to conclude that 
its overall poor performance when predicting interruption is because of the inclusion 
of a few exceptional cases.  
 
(d) Interpretation and Discussion 
 
  The results reported in the previous section may usefully be interpreted in 
terms of the conceptual framework introduced in Section 5. It would seem that initial 
conditions, as reflected by a wide range of macroeconomic variables, exert no 
significant influence over the implementation of IMF programs. This is broadly 
consistent with what has been found in earlier studies. Relatively large current 
account or fiscal deficits do not foretell poor implementation. The view that there is a 
standard or conventional program with similar targets that will be more difficult to 
achieve where initial conditions are relatively weak is not supported by our evidence. 
One potential inference is that, in negotiating programs and designing conditionality, 
the size of the economic disequilibria that need to be corrected is taken into account.  
  From the economic variables we examine, only trade openness has a 
significant effect on implementation. This is a robust finding and applies irrespective 
of whether implementation is gauged by the interruption or the disbursement measure. 
It also confirms the findings reported by Joyce (2003). Open economies are more 
likely to implement IMF programs. So what is going on? It could be that conventional  22
IMF-supported policy measures have a greater chance of being effective in open 
economies. Foreign trade elasticities, for example, may be higher making exchange 
rate adjustment or the management of aggregate demand more effective policy 
instruments. It may also be that, as suggested by Joyce (2003), greater openness 
reflects a closer proximity between the policy preferences of governments and those 
of the IMF. Openness has not uncommonly been used as a proxy for economic 
liberalization more broadly defined. Following this line of argument, our finding is 
consistent with the claim that implementation depends on commitment and on the 
degree of ownership of the program. Countries that have open economies may be 
more likely to accept and endorse the IMF’s analysis and therefore carry through 
agreed programs.   
  There is, however, a potential downside to openness. Open economies may be 
more vulnerable to trade shocks. In principle, it could therefore be that open 
economies are not only more likely to implement IMF programs, but are also more 
likely to turn to the Fund for assistance. However, studies of the determinants of IMF 
lending do not identify openness as a significant factor (Bird, 1996). Moreover, in our 
own regression analysis we incorporated various measures of exposure to shocks, 
such as a primary product exporter dummy, and a measure of export concentration 
(not reported in this paper) and we did not find them to be significant in our preferred 
model. This may imply that the Fund has used waivers and program modifications to 
protect programs from interruption and to sustain the flow of IMF resources to the 
affected countries. Of course, as we noted in Section 5, shocks can be either positive 
or negative. In principle, non-disbursement of an IMF credit could be as much to do 
with a positive trade shock that raises export revenue and reduces the need for IMF 
support, as with a negative shock that makes it more difficult to comply with the  23
original conditionality. The connection between the incidence of shocks and the 
implementation of IMF programs is likely to be more subtle and nuanced that we 
allow for in this paper. And, as with some of the other variables we find to be 
systematically insignificant, there may be a more complex story to be told in which 
factors that are significant idiosyncratically, and in different ways, wash out in large 
sample regression analysis.  
  In the short-run, the IMF can do little about a country’s exposure to shocks 
apart from encouraging it to pursue a development strategy based on efficient export 
diversification, although it can, and our evidence suggests that it has, offset the effects 
of shocks via waivers and modifications. It can also provide further protection against 
negative shocks by offering supplementary finance in the event of them reoccurring. 
This is a path down which the Fund is moving in terms of its recently adopted 
exogenous shocks facility, although experience with the now little used Compensatory 
Financing Facility is cautionary.  
  Our evidence suggests that the Fund can also affect implementation through 
the amount of financial assistance it provides or, perhaps more accurately, the amount 
of finance it stands ready to provide. It is tempting to interpret this finding in a simple 
fashion. According to this interpretation, IMF resources ‘bribe’ countries to pursue 
unpleasant and politically costly policies. The bigger the ‘bribe’ the bigger the 
incentive to implement the IMF program, since the losers from the reforms can be 
better compensated. However, the reality of what is going on may be more complex 
than this. In other studies of IMF operations, and in particular in some studies of IMF 
catalysis, it is reported that the significant effect that the size of IMF loans is found to 
have is conditional upon the loans not being fully used (Mody and Savaria, 2006). It 
would be appear that having the resources in reserve, but also showing that they are  24
not needed, is what is important. The way in which the size of loans affects 
implementation may again be more subtle that the simple interpretation suggests.  
  Our results strongly confirm that domestic politics exert a significant influence 
over implementation whether measured by interruption or by disbursement. This is a 
robust finding and one that provides evidential support for the theoretical analyses of 
implementation that emphasize the importance of powerful opposition to the reforms 
favored in the IMF program. Up until now empirical investigations into the 
importance of special interest groups (SIGs) have been hampered by poor data. The 
empirical proxies have only loosely reflected the theoretical ideas. For example, the 
number of political parties in parliament will be a very imprecise measure of the 
influence of SIGs. The important question is whether those opposed to the economic 
reforms embedded in IMF programs possess the power to disrupt implementation; are 
they ‘veto players’. The data we use allows us to come closer than previous studies to 
capturing the influence of opposition groups by using data recently assembled by the 
World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions. As a consequence we find that while 
conventionally used measures of SIGs generate insignificant results, confirming the 
results achieved by Joyce (2003) and by Dreher (2003), our measure of veto players is 
significant; a result that is robust across both the interruption and disbursement 
measures of implementation. The result not only provides empirical support for the 
theory of special interests as articulated by Drazen (2001) and others, but it also 
supports initiatives to promote national ownership. In a related paper one of us has 
argued that the political economy of implementation requires the IMF to temper the 
design of its programs in terms of technical economics (Bird and Willett, 2005) and 
the findings reported in this study further reinforce this suggestion. They also suggest  25
that the Fund needs to offer more effective support to governments in explaining the 
rationale of proposed economic reforms to civil society and opposition groups.  
  While we find empirical support for the role of veto players in explaining 
implementation, our results fail to find support for other political variables such as 
regime durability and the stage of the electoral cycle. Again, however, and given that 
other studies do report findings to suggest that these factors may be significant, it may 
be premature to eschew their potential influence at this stage. Regime durability has 
sometimes been interpreted to capture Olson’s claim (Olson, 1993) that as the time in 
power of the incumbent regime increases, SIGs are better able to identify more clearly 
how they are affected by policy and to organize more effective opposition. Incumbent 
governments may find it progressively more difficult to alter the status quo, or may 
experience a higher degree of policy inertia that limits their ability to implement IMF 
conditionality. As far as the electoral cycle is concerned, Dreher (2003) finds, albeit 
limited, support for it. Some of the specifications of our overall model that were less 
satisfactory and are not reported here also hinted that the election cycle could be 
significant, although we found that whether an election was imminent or had very 
recently occurred was insignificant. The implementation of programs instead seemed 
to improve significantly only after some months had elapsed since an election. 
Perhaps new governments need a period of time to negotiate their own programs with 
the Fund. Thus, while our preferred model rejects the systematic significance of the 
electoral cycle, there may be a remaining suspicion that, on occasion, it may be 
important and that there may be opposing forces that cancel out in large sample 
studies.  
  Overall our results are consistent with what we anticipated. We find that 
implementation depends on country characteristics (trade openness), the amount of  26
IMF resources made available, and the strength of veto players in opposing reform. 
Narrow explanations based exclusively on economic variables fall short. Moreover, 
some conventional arguments that implementation is adversely affected by the size of 
initial macroeconomic disequilibria seem to be misplaced. Our findings also offer 
some value added over simple guesses based on the historical record of 
implementation. But this applies to non-interruption rather than to interruption. The 
inference could be that programs may be interrupted for a relatively wide range of 
reasons that are of idiosyncratic or occasional rather than systematic importance, as 
well as those that we identify as systematically significant. The next stage in our 
research is to examine the outliers identified by our probit estimation in order to 
discover what these factors may be. In any event, while we fail to provide a 
‘complete’ explanation of implementation, we do discover a range of robustly 
significant determinants that exert a systematic influence. These in turn have 
important implications for the design of policy. Our findings suggest that policy 
initiatives within the Fund are moving in the right direction, but they may not yet have 
moved far enough.  
 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
When assessing the effectiveness of IMF programs we need to take into account that 
not all of them are fully implemented. Moreover, implementation appears to matter 
when explaining the overall effects of IMF programs. What is the benefit of 
conditionality if it is not implemented? More specifically, if conditionality is designed 
to send out a signal that governments are committed to economic reform, poor 
implementation creates noise around the signal that makes it difficult to discern. If the  27
policy imperative is to improve the rate of implementation, it is important to 
understand the factors that influence it. 
  Theoretical analysis has identified a range of potential determinants, and 
empirical investigation is needed to clarify which of these are systematically 
significant in practice.  A relatively small number of studies have provided some 
preliminary insights, but they have also illustrated the methodological challenges and 
data difficulties. There has been a range of sometimes conflicting results which 
transmit confusing messages for policy.  
  This paper contributes to this growing field of study. It draws on the most up-
to-date theoretical work to isolate a group of factors that may be expected a priori to 
influence implementation. It suggests empirical proxies for these factors drawing on 
the most up-to-date data. It uses a range of economic and political variables and 
applies appropriate regression techniques to a large data set covering 95 countries 
over the period 1992 – 2004. It also tests for robustness by examining various 
measures of implementation.  
  In terms of economic variables, conventional indicators of macroeconomic 
performance and policy emerge as being insignificant. Instead, it is trade openness 
that makes a difference; economies that are more open have a better record of 
implementation. 
  Confirming recent theoretical contributions and using the best available data, 
we also discover that implementation is disadvantaged by the existence of veto 
players, although other political factors appear to be systematically insignificant.  
  Although the paper provides value added to our understanding of 
implementation, it does not as yet allow us to predict, with confidence, the probability 
that individual programs will or will not be implemented. But the results reported here  28
do suggest that predictions will be wide of the mark if they fail to include salient 
political factors. This suggests that the IMF needs to take domestic politics into 
account when forming a judgment as to whether programs will be implemented. The 
results also suggest that the Fund has been right to stress the importance of national 
ownership, although it remains to be seen whether the related policy initiatives will be 
adequate to improve implementation. 
  Further research also needs to focus on formulating a more sophisticated 
political economy approach to implementation. Given the shortcomings of large 
sample data relating to political variables, this is likely to involve collecting together a 
series of structured case studies that can more successfully capture idiosyncratic 
economic and political variables.   29
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 APPENDIX I. Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION  SOURCE 
PROXIES FOR THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Disbursement Ratio  Share of committed funds disbursed  IMF Country Reports 
Program Interruption  Irreversible Interruption Dummy  Ivanova et al. (2003) 
Nsouli et al. (2004) 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
FDI  Net Foreign Direct Investment as percent of GDP  WDI 
Money Growth  Rate of monetary expansion  WDI 
Trade Volume  Sum of imports and exported divided by GDP  WDI 
Growth  GDP growth rate  WEO 
Government Balance  Central Government Balance/GDP  IFS 
Inflation Inflation  IFS 
Current Account   Current Account Balance/GDP  WEO 
Reserve/Imports  Reserves to Imports in months  WEO 
Primary Product Exporter  Dummy for Primary Product Exporter  WDI 
GDP per capita  Initial GDP per capita (constant at 2000)  WDI 
IMF RELATED VARIABLES 
Loans to Quota  Approved IMF Credit in relation to a country’s quota  Nsouli et al. (2004) 
Fund months spent  Number of months spent in IMF-supported programs  Nsouli et al. (2004) 
POLITICAL ECONOMY VARIABLES 
Pre-election  Share of the year which is within twelve months prior 
to a national election 
Dreher and Vaubel 
(2005) 
Post-election  Share of the year which is within twelve months after 
to a national election 
Dreher and Vaubel 
(2005) 
Veto Players  Number of veto players in the legislature  DPI 
Democracy  Indicator of type of regime. Includes measures of (a) 
competitiveness of political participation, (b) 
competitiveness of executive recruitment and, (c) 
constraints on the chief executive. Ranges from 
strongly autocratic (-10) to strongly democratic (+10) 
Polity IV 
Strength of Special Interest  Computed as the maximum share of seats in the 
parliament held by parties representing religious, 
nationalistic, regional and rural interest groups. 
DPI 
Regime Durability  Regime Durability, the number of years since the most 
recent regime change 
Polity IV 
Quality of Bureaucracy  Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy 
measured on a 4 point scale. 
ICRG 
Corruption  Corruption within the political system, 6 points.  ICRG 
Ethnic Tensions  The degree of tension within a country attributable to 
racial, nationality or language division. Higher ratings 
suggest minimal tension, 6 points. 
ICRG  31
. APPENDIX II. Robustness Checks 
 
 
Probit Analysis of Program 
Interruption 
Logit Analysis of Program 
Interruption 









Trade Volume to GDP  -0.006 (0.003) *  -0.002 **  -0.010 (0.005) *  -0.002 **  0.273 (0.137)**  0.150 ** 
Veto Players  0.119 (0.063) *  0.046 *  0.195 (0.102) *  0.047 *  -6.650 (2.349) *  -3.673*** 
IMF Loans to Quota  -0.172 (0.096) *  -0.067 *  -0.306 (0.179) *  -0.074 *     
            
Constant  -0.026 (0.339)    -0.001 (0.561)    95.587 
(13.205)*** 
 
            
No. of Observations  145    145    112   
Log-likelihood -92.622    -92.503    -349.216   
 
Notes:   Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
  *** indicates significance at 1 percent;  
** indicates significance at 5 percent;  
* indicates significance at 10 percent level.  32
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-0.403 -0.745  1 
 
Notes:   Based on programs approved between 1992 and 2004. Each cell 
contains Pearson Correlation Coefficient. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on IMF data.  36
Table 2. Record on Implementation 
 
  Programs Span Countries Implementation 
(%)  Proxy 
Beveridge and 
Kelly (1980)  105 1969-78 105  60  Fiscal Conditionality  
Haggard (1985)  30  1974-84  30  20  Interruption and 
Conditionality 
Zulu and Nsouli 
(1985)  35 1980-81 35  61  Objectives and 
Instruments 
Edwards (1989)  34  1983-85  34  31  Fiscal Conditionality 
Polak (1991)  22  1988-99  22  50  Fiscal Conditionality 
Killick (1995)  305  1979-93  -  47  Disbursement Rate 
(80%) 









Edwards (2001)  347  1979-97  -  60  Non-interruption 
Ivanova et al. 





Nsouli et al. 










 Table 3.  Empirical Evidence on Implementation 
 
 
Programs Span Countries  Proxy  Method  Results 
Edwards (1989)  34  1983-85  34  Conditionality Case  Negative  shocks 
Polak (1991)  22  1988-99  -  Conditionality Case  Negative  shocks 
Killick (1995)  305  1979-93  -  Disbursement Rate  Probit  Export base, Debt, Size of IMF loan 
Mecagni (1999)  36  1986-99  28  Interruption  Case  External shocks, domestic political 
economy factors 
Ivanova et al. 






Special interests, political cohesion, 
inefficient bureaucracy, ethnic 
fractionalization 
Nsouli et al. 





Political stability, military involvement, 
corruption, ethnic tensions, growth, size 
of IMF loan 
Joyce (2003)  384  1975-99  77  Disbursement Rate  Tobit  Democracy, trade volume, length of 
tenure, ethnic fractionalization 
Dreher (2003)  104  1975-98  67  Disbursement Rate  Probit 
Democracy, elections, government 
consumption, short-term debt, GDP pc, 
budget deficit 




Volume of Trade, Number of Veto 
Players, IMF Loans relative to Quota  33
Table 4.  Countries and Programs 
 
Albania  1993, 1998, 2002  Lao People's Dem. Rep. 1993, 2001 
Algeria  1994, 1995  Latvia  1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001 
Argentina  1992, 1996, 2000, 2003  Lesotho  1994, 1995, 1996, 2001 
Armenia  1995, 1996, 2001  Lithuania  1993, 1994, 2000, 2001 
Azerbaijan 1995,  1996,  1996 Macedonia  (FYR)  1995, 1997, 2000, 2000, 2003 
Belarus 1995 Madagaskar  1996,  2001 
Benin  1993, 1996, 2000  Malawi  1994, 1995, 2000 
Bolivia  1994, 1998  Mali  1992, 1996, 1999 
Bosnia & Herzergovina  1998, 2002  Mauritania  1992, 1995, 1999, 2003 
Brazil  1998, 2001, 2002  Mexico  1995, 1999 
Bulgaria  1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2002Moldova  1993, 1995, 1996, 2000 
Burkina Faso  1993, 1996, 1999  Mongolia  1993, 1997, 2001 
Cambodia  1994, 1999  Mozambique  1996, 1999 
Cameroon  1994, 1995, 1997, 2000  Nepal  1992 
Cape Verde  1998, 2002  Nicaragua  1994, 1998 
Central African Republic  1994, 1998  Niger  1994, 1996, 2000 
Chad  1994, 1995, 2000  Pakistan  1993, 1994, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1997, 2000, 2001
Colombia  1999, 2003  Panama  1995, 1997, 2000 
Congo  1994, 1996  Papua New Guinea  1995, 2000 
Congo Democratic Republic  2002  Peru  1993, 1996, 2001, 2002 
Costa Rica  1993, 1995  Philippines  1994, 1998 
Cote D'Ivoire  1994, 1998  Poland  1993, 1994 
Croatia  1994, 1997, 2001  Romania  1994, 1997, 1999, 2001 
Czech Republic  1993  Russian Federation 1995,  1996, 1996, 1999 
Djibouti 1996,  1999  Rwanda  1998 
Dominican Republic  1993, 2003  Senegal  1994, 1994, 1998 
Ecuador  1994, 2000, 2003  Serbia and Montenegro  2001, 2002 
Equatorial Guinea  1993  Sierra Leone  1994, 1994, 2001 
Egypt  1993, 1996  Slovak Republic  1994, 1994 
El Salvador  1993, 1995, 1997, 1998  Sri Lanka  2001 
Estonia  1993, 1995, 1997, 2000  Tajikistan  1998 
Ethiopia  1996, 2001  Tanzania  1996, 2000 
Gabon  1994, 1995, 2000, 2004  Thailand  1997 
Gambia 1998,  2002  Togo  1994 
Georgia  1995, 1996, 2001  Turkey  1994, 1999, 2002 
Ghana  1995, 1999  Uganda  1994, 1997 
Guinea  1997, 2001  Ukraine  1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 
Guinea-Bissau  1995, 2000  Uruguay  1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002 
Guyana 1994,  1998  Uzbekistan  1995 
Haiti 1995,  1996  Venezuela  1996 
Honduras  1992, 1999  Vietnam  1993, 1994, 2001 
Hungary  1993, 1996  Yemen  1996, 1997, 1997 
Indonesia  1997, 1998, 2000  Zambia  1995, 1995, 1999 
Jamaica  1992  Zimbabwe  1992, 1992, 1998, 1999 
Jordan  1994, 1996, 1999, 2002     
Kazakhstan 1994,  1995, 1996, 1999     
Kenya 1993,  1996,  2000     
Korea 1997     
Kyrgyz Republic  1993, 1994, 1998, 2001      34
Table 5. Estimation Results 
 
 
Notes:   Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
  *** indicates significance at 1 percent;  
** indicates significance at 5 percent;  















Probit Analysis of Program 
Interruption 
Probit Analysis of Program 






Trade Volume to GDP  -0.006 (0.003) *  -0.002 **  -0.139 (0.004) ***  -0.005 *** 
Veto Players  0.119 (0.063) *  0.046 *  0.195 (0.071) ***  0.071 *** 
IMF Loans to Quota  -0.172 (0.096) *  -0.067 *  -0.490 (0.189) ***  -0.067 *** 
        
Constant  -0.026  (0.339)  0.393  (0.400)  
        
No. of Observations  145    139   
R-squared  (McFadden)  0.061  0.155  
Log-likelihood  -92.622  -93.300  
      
Prediction  success      
Interruption correctly 
predicted 
41%  45%  
Non-interruption 
correctly predicted 
82%  80%  
Total  65%  66%   35
 
                                                 
1 For an earlier discussion of the rate of ‘veto players’ see Tsebelis (2001) and for a theoretical analysis 
of special interests see Grossman and Helpman (1994 and 2001).  
 
2 The IEO (2002) finds substantial errors and gaps in the MONA database for tracking performance 
under programs, especially with regard to data on outcomes. It concludes that “existing weaknesses in 
data on how programs have performed are an impediment to efforts to enhance the IMF’s ability to 
learn from experience and to monitor the implementation and impact of its own policies”.  
 
3 To check for the robustness of our conclusions, we use the logit model on the assumption that the 
cumulative distribution is logistic. The results of the logit regression confirm the findings of the probit 
regression. The estimated coefficients and marginal effects are very similar, with similar degrees of 
significance. See Appendix II for a comparison of the results.  
 
4 To control for the influence of elections, an index is used which measures the share of the year which 
is within twelve months prior to a national (executive or legislative) election. For example, if an 
election is in February, the pre-election index would take the value of 1/12 and the post-election index 
would take the value of 10/12. 
 
5 We have also created two other implementation indices by breaking down the disbursement rate into 
four and five intervals. The first index of implementation classifies program countries as non-compliers 
for 0 to 25%, poor compliers for 26 to 50%, weak compliers for 51 to 75% and good compliers for 76 
to 100%. The second index breaks the disbursement rate into 5 intervals; 0-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-
80% and 81-100%. Using the ordered probit model and following the same procedure of log likelihood 
tests, we find support for the significance of the veto players variable. It is significant at one percent 
and has a negative coefficient in both specifications.  
 
6 The precise computation of the residual taking account for the variation of the estimator is as follows;  
ii i i i h F y r − − = 1 / ˆ , where [ ] [ ] i i i i ii x Var Asy Est x x F x F h β β β ˆ . . ' ) ' ˆ ( 1 ) ' ˆ ( − = , and  i F ˆ  
denotes the fitted probability estimator.  
 
 
 
 
 
 